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Over the years, many attempts have been made to reform gov-
ernment regulation, but success has been very limited. These 
efforts have been severely hampered by distrust on both sides of 
the regulatory debate. Individuals committed to protecting public 
health, safety, and the environment are suspicious of any effort 
that is seen as possibly obstructing or delaying their objectives. In 
contrast, people advocating the reduction of "big govemment" decry 
those who would proceed rapidly to address various problems with 
costly or ill-designed remedies. 
To reconcile these two polar extremes, or at least to narrow 
the gap between them, it is necessary to raise the level of under-
standing of the galaxy of issues involved. That objective, in turn, 
requires a far better flow of information, one based on sound sci-
ence and professional analysis. Moreover, a broader approach is in 
order in the regulatory process than has been customary. 
The most carefully constructed and well-grounded analysis, 
however, can antagonize citizen groups, which may jump to the 
conclusion that wetlands are about to be paved over or national for-
ests sold to the highest bidder. Any successful and comprehensive 
reform must have a perspective that is not threatening to the wide-
spread concems of citizens-and that positive approach to achieving 
the nation's social priorities must be translated into reality. 
[T]he various parties to the regulatory debate should 
recognize that the American people believe there is a 
legitimate need for government regulation to achieve 
economic and social goals of high priority to the nation. 
In that spirit, the various parties to the regulatory debate 
should recognize that the American people believe there is a le-
gitimate need for government regulation to achieve economic and 
social goals of high priority to the nation. There are many areas in 
which regulation is accepted without question. Airline safety is an 
obvious example; the public is reassured by the licensing of pilots. 
Similarly, restrictions on child labor in the United States are no 
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longer controversial. Agencies such as the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) may be viewed as bureaucratic and burden-
some "alphabet soup" by those subject to their rulings, but the public 
at large strongly supports continuing government involvement in 
their areas of responsibility. Serious shortcomings in market 
outcomes and in the conduct of business often generate or in-
crease public support for government intervention in private-
sector decision making. 
The writing of the specific statute, which has been 
largely ignored by most organized efforts at regulatory 
reform, is usually the most important action in what is 
an extended rule-making process 
However, the process of regulation-the way in which a na-
tional priority or concern is translated into a specific rule-is not 
widely understood. It does not begin when a government agency 
issues a ruling. Rather, it starts much earlier, when Congress 
passes a law establishing a regulatory agency and gives it a man-
date to issue rules governing some activity. The writing of the 
specific statute, which has been largely ignored by most organized 
efforts at regulatory reform, is usually the most important action 
in what is an extended rule-making process. Basic defects in the 
enabling legislation cannot be cured by the regulatory agency con-
cerned or anywhere else in the executive branch. 
Regulations are promulgated by agencies in response to laws 
passed by Congress to address some perceived "market failure" or 
to achieve a social goal. Regulatory proceedings are not, for the 
most part, mere matters of procedure and conformance. Rather, 
they spring from the desire for clean air, safe drinking water, safe 
workplaces, reliable financial markets, improved medicines, and 
competitive industries. 
Yet, achieving these desirable results is far more complicated 
than is commonly understood. It is not simply a matter of Con-
gress proclaiming worthy goals or an executive branch agency 
promulgating rules to that effect. The regulatory process is funda-
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mentally bureaucratic, with all the powers and shortcomings associ-
ated with government. Even at its best, regulation is a blunt and 
imperfect tool. Far too often, it imposes costs that greatly outweigh 
the benefits achieved, often unnecessarily. 
Setting the Stage for Reform 
In seriously considering the subject of regulation, an impor-
tant distinction needs to be made between two types: economic regu-
lation, historically used by such agencies as the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the Maritime Commission, 
and two agencies which Congress has terminated, the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB) and the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC), and social regulation, performed by EPA, OSHA, and similar 
government agencies of fairly recent origin. The characteristics 
of the two types of regulation are very different and so are the ways 
of improving them. 
Economic regulation relates primarily to such aspects of busi-
ness as prices, profits, entry, and exit. Typically, an agency or com-
mission regulates a specific sector of the economy, such as 
transportation, communications, utilities, or banking. Social regu-
lation, in contrast, is characterized by the use of agencies orga-
nized along functional or issue lines (ecology, discrimination, 
product safety) rather than industry categories. Many of these agen-
cies have power to regulate across all industries, although their 
jurisdiction is limited to one aspect of business activity. 
Since the 1970s there has been a strong and consistent effort 
to reform or eliminate economic regulations where competition 
adequately serves the public interest. Thus, the CAB and the ICC 
have been terminated; the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) no longer regulates brokers' commission rates; and the FCC 
is beginning, somewhat fitfully, to let competition replace rate regu-
lation in the rapidly changing telecommunications industry. 
The staffing of federal economic regulatory agencies (nearly 
30,000 persons in 1997) is dwarfed by the much larger array of 
inspectors, reviewers, and other officials of federal agencies en-
gaged in social regulation (almost 94,000 in number). However, 
there has been no sustained effort to reduce social regulations. 
On the contrary, the recent tendency has been to expand the scope 
of this activity. 
In some cases, citizens become so used to regulation that they 
forget the value of marketplace competition in protecting consum-
ers. For decades, regulation by the ICC was accepted by the truck-
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ing industry as a fact of life. But since the effective dismantling of 
these controls in the early 1980s, thousands of additional firms 
have entered this market, and the cost of transporting goods in the 
United States has been reduced by billions of dollars a year. The 
demise of the ICC goes unmourned. 
Thus, substantial progress has been made in deregulating 
some key sectors of the economy- notably transportation, com-
munication, and financial services- in which competition does 
an effective job of protecting consumer interests. The United States 
has enjoyed large productivity gains in these sectors relative to 
other industrial economies because it has successfully challenged 
the traditional approach of selecting regulation or public owner-
ship for utilities and related industries and opted instead for the 
relatively "radical" solution of competition. 
The marketplace does not function perfectly. But the 
relevant question in any given instance is whether it 
works better than regulation. 
It is helpful to recall the limits as well as the advantages of 
reliance on the market mechanism. Marketplace competition is 
not an effective way of directing people to follow very specific courses 
of action. Control of automobile traffic provides an example. Traf-
fic lights, stop signs, and similar command-and-control devices are 
an accepted part of everyday life. However, for producing changes 
in behavior that are less specific or that differ among individuals 
or organizations, economic incentives can be useful. For example, 
lower fees for toll bridges and toll highways during off-peak hours 
can reduce the road congestion facing the command-and-control 
traffic system at peak hours of usage. Likewise, a statutory or 
administrative command-and-control apparatus can set a specific 
level of air or water purity for society to strive to achieve, but emis-
sion fees or tradable permits can achieve this same level at lower 
cost than conventional regulatory control mechanisms. 
The marketplace does not function perfectly. But the relevant 
question in any given instance is whether it works better than 
regulation. The response is less a matter of philosophy than of 
practicality. The answer can be "yes" or "no," depending on such 
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Table 1 
Paperwork Burden Imposed on 
Business and Individuals by the 
Federal Government, Fiscal Year 1996 
Department or Agency 
Treasury (primarily IRS) 
Defense 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Health and Human SeNices 
Labor 
Federal Trade Commission 
Agriculture 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Transportation 
Education 
Justice 
Housing and Urban Development 
Social Security Administration 
All other 
Total 
Burden 
(millions of hours) 
5,347 
258 
189 
168 
154 
146 
112 
100 
91 
60 
35 
32 
27 
129 
6,848 
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Information Management 
Plan of the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1996). 
factors as the type of regulation and the state of technology. 
The costs imposed by regulation also are often broader than many 
people realize. In addition to specific equipment that may have to be 
added to an automobile or to a production line to meet a federal re-
quirement, the government directive may also have powerful indi-
rect influences. A case in point is the value of time that people must 
spend waiting in line for permits and inspections or filling out forms. 
Table 1 summarizes the estimated paperwork burden imposed 
by the federal government in fiscal year 1996. If we value the time 
of those filling out the forms very conservatively at the national 
average hourly earnings of about $16 an hour, the cost of the 6.8 
billion hours consumed was about $110 billion. Since those actu-
ally performing much of the paperwork are likely to have earnings 
substantially above the average, the actual economic cost was no 
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doubt even higher. 
The impact on consumers can be even less transparent, es-
pecially since regulations often have unintended consequences. 
Take the case of a federal requirement that the household ladder 
be made safer. Such an action not only increases the cost of the 
product, but may make it more difficult to use. As a result, many 
families may forgo purchasing this more expensive and less con-
venient item and stand on chairs or tabletops instead. The unin-
tended adverse result, the reduction of safety in the home, would 
not be apparent from merely reading the proposed rule. 
In another ironic example, the current narrow tolerance stan-
dards on pesticide residues on fresh fruits and vegetables do more 
than merely increase the costs of nutritious foods. A diet rich in 
fruits and vegetables may reduce cancer rates far more than would 
eliminating trace pesticides on those foods. Because the stan-
dards are so tight, many low-income persons, in particular, do not 
eat sufficient fruits and vegetables; these foods have become too 
costly. On balance, cancer rates may actually be higher because 
pesticide restrictions are too rigid. That unintended result only 
becomes apparent when we trace through the effects of the 
govemment's rule making. Clearly, the rhetorical claim that oner-
ous regulation is always justified because "lives are more impor-
tant than dollars" is far too simplistic. 
On the other hand, critics of regulation must keep in mind 
the many instances in which regulations, sometimes with very 
large costs, have served the public interest. Thus, EPA's two-de-
cade-old regulation requiring refiners to stop adding lead to gaso-
line was an effective way to eliminate hazardous lead particles from 
exhaust fumes. The costs were substantial; the rule required re-
finers to adopt more expensive refining techniques, since lead had 
been a low-cost octane booster. But these costs were exceeded by 
the important public health gains that resulted from lower levels of 
lead in the environment. 
It is heartening to realize that changes in the regulatory pro-
cess do not have to start at square one. The appropriate question 
no longer is, "Are you for or against environmental or workplace 
regulation?" That question has long been answered. The relevant 
questions relate to how those regulatory mandates are carried out-
to the degree of rule making and the specific approaches directed 
by a statute or a government agency. Most studies of govemment 
regulation conclude that adopting sensible reforms could result in 
greater social benefits being achieved with the same resources 
now committed to complying with regulations-or equivalent ben-
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efits at much lower economic cost. In this regard, regulatory fail-
ure in the public sector can be as costly as market failure in the 
private sector. 
The Need for Change in the 
Regulatory Regime 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of benefits (an 
important subject to which we shall return), the dollar costs of regu-
lation are too large to be ignored. In the aggregate, the costs of 
government regulations exceed the budgetary cost of all federal 
domestic discretionary programs. The widely used estimate pre-
pared by CSAB adjunct scholar Thomas Hopkins shows that com-
plying with federal regulation cost $677 billion (or over $3,000 per 
capita) in 1996 and will cost $721 billion in the year 2000. More-
over, those regulatory costs fall disproportionately on small busi-
nesses; the burden of compliance for firms with fewer than 20 
workers in 1992 was about 90 percent higher per employee than 
for companies with 500 or more workers. 
From a more aggregate viewpoint, 
regulation impairs economic growth. 
From a more aggregate viewpoint, regulation impairs economic 
growth. It is estimated that, when the Clean Air Act of 1990 is fully 
implemented in 2005, it (in combination with preexisting environ-
mental regulation) will have reduced the nation's capital stock by 
four percent, increased the cost of capital by five percent, andre-
duced the real gross domestic product, as conventionally measured, 
by more than three percent. Moreover, this analysis does not in-
clude the effects of costly new air quality standards for ozone (smog) 
and particulates established in late 1997. 
Many people find it hard to comprehend such important, but 
abstract, aggregate effects. For this reason, the micro analysis 
presented in Table 2 may be helpful. This tabulation shows how a 
business firm becomes subject to more and more regulation as it 
grows in size. Hiring a fifteenth employee, for example, means 
that the firm must comply with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 
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the Americans With Disabilities Act. Hiring five more people sub-
jects the employer to the Age Discrimination Act, the Older Worker 
Benefit Protection Act, and COBRA (requiring the continuation of 
medical benefits for up to 18 months after a job termination). Ex-
panding the firm's labor force by still another five workers brings it 
under the purview of the Health Maintenance Organization Act 
and the Veterans Reemployment Act. Some companies have stated 
that they refrain from increasing employment specifically to avoid 
becoming subject to the next level of regulation. 
When the entire body of federal regulation is examined-some-
thing that is rarely done in the executive, legislative, or judicial 
branches-it becomes apparent that the resulting burdens of com-
pliance are enormous. The typical business firm in this country is 
subject to regulation of virtually every aspect of its activity. For 
each box on its organizational chart, from the board of directors 
down to first-line management, there is at least one govemment 
agency, and often more, with the power to shape, review, change, or 
veto the company's decisions. In the new, global marketplace, com-
plying with this vast array of rules handicaps American companies 
that compete against foreign frrms with lower cost structures. 
Regulatory costs, of course, are only half the equation. Were 
it evident that the benefits of most of the vast array of current 
regulations justified their economic costs, we should consider these 
costs well spent. But there is no sound basis for jumping to this 
conclusion. 
It is widely acknowledged that the positive results of many 
regulatory activities are subject to sharply diminishing retums. 
Benefits may greatly exceed costs for early interventions, but sub-
sequent actions tend to produce smaller benefits at sharply rising 
costs. In such circumstances, as a careful survey of environmen-
tal economics noted in 1992, "It will be quite easy ... to enact new, 
more stringent regulations that impose large costs on society, well 
in excess of the benefits." 
Recent reports on major environmental regulations reinforce 
these concerns. A study using the government's own regulatory 
impact analyses reveals that only 38 of the 83 major regulations 
analyzed by five major federal agencies from 1990 to 1995 met a 
benefit-cost standard (see Table 3). EPA leads the parade in pro-
mulgating rules whose costs exceed their benefits; 40 of their 61 
regulations flunk a benefit-cost test. This, perhaps, should not be 
surprising given the high and often uncritical public support for 
environmental protection recorded in opinion polls. But the public 
is ill-served when new rules produce more costs than benefits. 
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Table 3 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Major Regulations 
for Five Federal Agencies, 1990-1995 
Agency* Total CPSC MSHA NHTSA OSHA EPA 
Number of regulations 83 1 6 14 61 
Monetized benefits 
exceed costs 38 
*CPSC = Consumer Product Safety Commission; 
MSHA = Mine Safety & Health Administration; 
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NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; 
OSHA= Occupational Safety and Health Administration; 
EPA= Environmental Protection Agency. 
10 21 
Source: Robert Hahn, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved (Oxford University Press, 
1996). 
In addition to generating direct costs, regulation often retards 
the innovation process. Thus, reliance by the Department of Agri-
culture on continuous inspections instead of on modern sampling 
techniques discourages or delays adoption of new food safety tech-
nologies. Another example is in the treatment of new medical soft-
ware that models the reaction of cancerous tumors when treated 
with a specific dose of radiation. The FDA has ruled that this soft-
ware must be approved as a "medical device." As a result, even a 
slight change in computer code can require time-consuming and 
expensive reapproval. Yet, the FDA regulations on medical devices 
surely did not contemplate the inclusion of medical computer soft-
ware. 
The extensive regulatory reviews to which many new prod-
ucts are subjected in the United States inevitably raise the cost of 
product innovation and increase the uncertainty of financial suc-
cess. However, many companies bypass these barriers to innova-
tion by establishing research laboratories and production facilities 
abroad. Pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms provide strik-
ing illustrations. Companies moving to the Netherlands, for ex-
ample, are not seeking a weak or ineffective regulatory 
environment, but one that is more flexible and efficient (nor are 
firms locating in Holland looking for low-cost labor). 
In many instances, contemporary regulatory activity is a ves-
tige of responses to problems that have long since passed. A clear 
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example is the Davis-Bacon Act, which prescribes "prevailing" wages 
on government construction contracts that are generally above the 
market wages received by other workers in construction jobs. The 
statute, which was enacted in the depths of the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, was designed to prevent sweatshop conditions in the 
building trades. Sixty years later, the original justification has 
long since disappeared, but the statute and its regulations survive 
in full force. Any sound economic reason to continue such wage 
regulation has yet to be articulated. 
Another striking example of the persistence of obsolete rules 
is found in the administration of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA). EPA's Office of Solid Waste (which adminis-
ters RCRA) originally placed silver on its toxic characteristic list 
because silver was ~o listed by EPA's Office of Drinking Water. How-
ever, in January 1991, the Office of Drinking Water eliminated the 
standard for silver because it determined that silver in drinking 
water had no adverse effects on humans. Yet, silver remains on 
RCRA's list of toxic substances. Such examples dramatically illus-
trate the need for periodic reviews of regulations to ensure that 
their original purpose remains valid and that shortcomings that 
emerge from the reviews be corrected. 
It is easy to identify regulatory programs that have serious 
deficiencies and elicit widespread objections. But the problem is 
more fundamental than suggested by lists of silly regulations. No 
one sets out deliberately to create burdensome and ineffective rules. 
Many of the underlying statutes have created huge and unneces-
sary costs because Congress responded to the concerns of some 
citizen groups without sufficiently analyzing the problems and the 
proposed solutions. Powerful examples are asbestos removal and 
superfund legislation. The shortcomings of these laws are too se-
rious to be brushed off by a general appeal to the universal desire 
for a healthy environment. 
It is useful to remind Congress that it passed a sweeping law 
that led cities and states to spend nearly $20 billion removing as-
bestos from public buildings, although EPA concluded, after some 
research, that ripping out asbestos was an expensive and danger-
ous mistake: the removal effort increased the asbestos fibers cir-
culating in the air. Obviously, the analysis should have preceded 
the legislation. Similarly, the congressionally enacted superfund 
law has turned out to be a costly bonanza for lawyers because the 
statute emphasized determining liability rather than reducing 
health risks. 
Compounding the problem, many regulatory statutes, espe-
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cially in the areas of environment and job safety, prohibit or se-
verely restrict any use of economic analysis in the executive 
branch's rule making process. The courts have supported EPA's 
position that costs should not be considered in establishing air qual-
ity standards. 
One universal shortcoming of standard rule making is appar-
ent. Each statute or rule is promulgated in isolation, as if no oth-
ers existed. If there is any lesson that we have learned in recent 
decades, it is that regulation is a powerful remedy that should be 
used only in situations where markets do not work adequately. 
Given ·the huge amount of regulation in force today, a compelling 
case can be made for economizing on the government's regulatory 
power. Like any strong medicine, regulation should be used care-
fully and with full attention to its adverse side effects. 
If there is any lesson that we have learned in recent 
decades, it is that regulation is a powerful remedy that 
should be used only in situations where markets do not 
work adequately. Given the huge amount of regulation 
in force today, a compelling case can be made for 
economizing on the government's regulatory power. 
Some people argue that regulatory review itself is costly and 
burdensome. Exactly the opposite is true. The United States sub-
stantially underinvests in information on regulatory programs and 
should significantly increase the resources devoted to that pur-
pose. Government regulatory activities involve hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars annually in benefits and costs. Yet, the unelected 
decision makers who issue and enforce these regulations usually 
have little knowledge of the magnitude of their impact-especially 
who bears the costs and who receives the benefits. Government 
agencies and 0 MB now spend $50 million or less each year to deal 
with these issues. Expenditures of several times this amount on 
such informational and analytical activities would be fully justified. 
Benefit-cost analysis can also serve broader purposes such as 
thinking systematically about social issues and more fully under-
standing the implications of selecting one plan of action over an-
other. Alternative approaches may not involve regulatory powers 
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at all. However used, a careful calculation of advantages and disad-
vantages provides an essential discipline to improve the current 
arbitrary procedure. 
To avoid problems inherent in placing monetary values on 
human lives, benefit-cost analysis sometimes can be structured 
in terms of lives themselves. For example, sodium nitrite, which 
is used to preserve food, is a mild carcinogen. Its use creates the 
possibility that a limited number of people will develop cancer. On 
the other hand, a far larger number of people would die of botulism 
if nitrites were not used as a preservative in meat. A comparison 
of the costs and benefits of restricting the use of nitrites in meats 
indicates that more lives are saved by its continued use. This type 
of comparison was the basis for the FDA's sensible decision not to 
ban nitrites in meat and, instead, merely to urge a reduction in 
their use. 
The recent experiences with air bags further demonstrate that 
neither the benefits nor the costs of regulation need be measured 
in dollars but at times should focus directly on human life. The 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued air bag stan-
dards based on automobile tests that made no distinctions about 
the occupants' age, sex, or height, although car manufacturers had 
informed the agency of the importance of this difference. As a 
result, children under the age of ten have experienced a net in-
crease in fatality risk because of air bags. At least 40 children in 
that age group have been killed by air bags in crashes that other-
wise would not typically have been fatal. In that case, the regula-
tory shortcoming was not an excess of analysis but a shortage of it. 
Previous Attempts to Reform Regulation 
A brief examination of previous attempts at reform provides a 
useful background for preparing recommendations to reform the 
regulatory system. 
Since 1974 every president of the United States has attempted 
to improve the regulatory process. President Gerald Ford launched 
an effort to modernize economic regulation, particularly with re-
spect to rate regulation of the transportation and financial indus-
tries. President Jimmy Carter maintained the momentum with 
the elimination of the CAB, the reduction of restrictions imposed 
by the ICC, and the creation of intense price competition in the 
financial industry. Both presidents also established formal sys-
tems to review new government regulations before they were is-
13 
sued. Every subsequent president has carried forward this general 
approach. Important lessons can be learned from their successes 
as well as their failures. 
President Ford's concerns about the inflationary impact of fed-
eral activities, especially regulation, marked the beginning of an or-
ganized, comprehensive effort at regulatory reform. His Executive 
Order 11821 established procedures for preparing "inflation impact 
statements" to illuminate the economic impact of regulatory propos-
als. The statements were prepared by the various executive agen-
cies and reviewed by the Council on Wage and Price Stability. 
The Ford administration focused on four reforms: (1) measur-
ing and considering the benefits and costs of proposed regulations, 
(2) reducing the backlog and delays in regulatory proceedings, (3) 
suggesting changes in legislation under which regulatory programs 
operate, and (4) ensuring that consumer interests prevail in regu-
latory proceedings. (Because the so-called independent agencies 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of presidential executive orders, 
Ford and his staff could only try to coax them into following the 
spirit, if not the letter, of his directive.) With some exceptions, the 
agencies paid merely lip service to this initiative. Nevertheless, 
this basic way of performing regulatory reviews has continued un-
der successive administrations, with revisions in the details re-
flecting experience gained over the years. 
To formalize regulatory review, President Carter issued Ex-
ecutive Order 12044, replacing Ford's "inflation impact statement" 
with a new "regulatory analysis." For all new regulations with an 
estimated economic impact of $100 million or more, preparation of 
a regulatory analysis was required prior to the publication of the 
regulation in the Federal Register. Each analysis included a de-
scription of the proposed rule, an identification of alternative ways 
of achieving the policy goal, and an examination of the economic 
impact of the regulation. A rudimentary cost-effectiveness test 
was also required to enforce the requirement that "the least bur-
densome of acceptable alternatives has been chosen." 
On balance, however, the 1970s will be remembered for an 
outpouring of new federal rules and an expansion of the number 
and size of regulatory agencies. The agencies subject to presiden-
tially-ordered regulatory review generally considered benefit-cost 
analysis merely to be the final hurdle to clear after they had com-
pleted the regulation design. 
Two procedural reforms were enacted by Congress in the last 
year of the Carter administration. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 
1980 required rule-making agencies to write regulations in a man-
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ner that would minimize burdens on small business. Compliance 
was minimal. Many agencies simply attached a perfunctory state-
ment to new rules to meet the law's formal requirements. 
The second and far more useful procedural law was the Paper-
work Reduction Act of 1980, which took effect after President Carter 
left office. The statute created the Office of Information and Regu-
latory Mfairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget to 
supervise enforcement of the law's objective of reducing federal 
reporting requirements. Early in 1981, President Ronald Reagan 
expanded OIRA's mission to encompass review of regulations pro-
mulgated by executive branch agencies. 
Regulatory reform was a basic component of President Reagan's 
economic agenda. One of his most important actions was to estab-
lish the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by Vice President 
George Bush, to oversee the reform effort. Executive Order 12291, 
issued in 1981, stated, "Regulatory action shall not be undertaken 
unless the potential benefits to society from the regulation out-
weigh the potential costs to society." The presidential directive 
required agencies to prepare a "regulatory impact analysis" sub-
ject to review by OIRA for each "major rule" pending. A federal 
agency could not publish a notice of proposed rule making until an 
OIRA review was complete and its concerns had been addressed. 
Executive Order 12291 had two real powers: (1) It required regu-
latory agencies to demonstrate that the benefits of a proposed regula-
tion exceeded the costs, and (2) it gave OIRA power to delay rule making 
until regulatory agencies had appropriately addressed these broader 
economic concems. Another strength of the order was that it al-
lowed OIRA to identify any rule as a major rule, not just those impos-
ing estimated costs of more than $100 million a year. 
The regulatory review process during the Reagan administra-
tion had a substantial impact, as indicated by the large number of 
proposed regulations retumed, changed, or withdrawn. During 1981 
through 1989, over 40 percent of the regulations of the Department 
of Labor failed, at least initially, to obtain OIRA approval. At the 
statutory level, President Reagan avoided new regulation. He nei-
ther proposed nor authorized a new regulatory agency or a new 
major regulatory program. 
President George Bush continued President Reagan's reforms. 
The Council on Competitiveness, which replaced the Task Force 
on Regulatory Relief in 1989, was also headed by the vice presi-
dent. Like the Task Force, the Council was authorized to review 
regulations with the aim of eliminating those that inhibited U.S. 
competitiveness, and it intervened in many specific regulatory mat-
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ters. The Council's procedures were frequently criticized, espe-
cially those permitting businesses to oppose pending regulations 
in special ex parte presentations. 
Presidential review of regulatory decisions was also questioned 
on constitutional grounds. The Bush administration's response 
emphasized that the Constitution empowers the president to see 
that laws are "faithfully executed." 
The incoming Clinton administration, in 1993, rescinded the 
existing executive orders on regulatory review and abolished the 
Council on Competitiveness. Nevertheless, regulatory reform con-
tinued to have a significant place on the federal agenda. 
Like its predecessors, the Clinton administration has 
issued formal guidelines on performing and using 
economic analysis, but recent rule making often ap-
pears to have honored them more in the breach than in 
the observance. 
President Bill Clinton replaced the Reagan-Bush directives 
with Executive Order 12866. He reaffirmed OMB (via OIRA) as the 
central agency to review proposed regulations. However, the new 
executive order made the process more accessible to the public by 
requiring OIRA to identify publicly its recommended changes for 
regulatory actions. Under the order, OMB retains no formal power 
to hold up rule making or to require a demonstration that the esti-
mated benefits of a regulation exceed its costs. Regulatory agen-
cies have to find only that the benefits of the intended regulation 
"justify" its costs. 
The Clinton executive order requires agencies to do many 
sensible things in drafting rules. They must identify alternative 
ways of meeting government objectives, consider benefits and costs, 
and use market-based alternatives and performance standards. The 
elimination of thousands of pages of environmental and pharma-
ceutical regulations is a positive result of that effort. However, 
new regulations have been added at such a rapid rate that they 
more than offset the reductions. 
Like its predecessors, the Clinton administration has issued 
formal guidelines on performing and using economic analysis, but 
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recent rule making often appears to have honored them more in 
the breach than in the observance. In the case of EPA, the largest 
regulatory agency, only six of 45 "significant" rules issued from 
April to September 1994 contained the required determination that 
the benefits justified the costs, only three were based on a compel-
ling public need, and only nine considered alternative approaches 
to regulating. Of the other 177 EPA rules issued during that period 
(including those not considered to be "significant"), none was sup-
ported by a determination that the benefits justified the costs. 
Meanwhile, the aggregate federal rule-making list has grown. 
The April 1998 semiannual regulatory plan (an innovation insti-
tuted in the Carter administration) requires over 1,500 pages 
merely to list short summaries of the regulatory actions that the 
federal departme:Q.ts and agencies are working on, including nearly 
250 entries by EPA alone. The staffs of federal regulatory agencies 
have also grown; the total of nearly 125,000 in 1996 represented a 
26 percent increase from the 1985 low. 
On balance, the formal systems of review put in place by presi-
dents from Ford through Clinton has helped convince often reluc-
tant officials of government agencies to analyze the implications of 
their rules before issuing them. That approach has been some-
what successful in getting regulators and their supporting interest 
groups to develop data on the costs and the benefits they impose on 
society. However, the impact of such analyses on the actual deci-
sion making of the regulatory agencies has been very limited. 
Congressional Efforts to Reform Regulation 
In response to the shortcomings of executive branch efforts to 
improve the regulatory process, many members of Congress have 
introduced bills to legislate generic regulatory reform. In 1995, the 
proposed Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act, which would have 
required each regulatory agency to show a detailed benefit-cost 
analysis prior to issuing a major new rule, failed by one vote in the 
Senate. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of 
complying with the proposed law at a modest $180 million a year 
(compared to the nearly $700 billion that regulation costs Ameri-
cans each year). 
Not all provisions of the various legislative proposals would 
have truly improved the regulatory process. In quite a few instances, 
the requirements to be imposed would have greatly complicated 
rule making. Although these changes would likely have slowed 
down the issuance of new rules, they also would have made it more 
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difficult to simplify or eliminate existing ones. 
Some of the proposed reform bills would have required detailed 
analysis of any regulation imposing annual costs of $25 million or 
more (or an average of $500,000 a state); other versions would set 
the threshold at $50 million. The benefit-cost ratio of performing 
the innumerable studies required by such a low threshold likely 
would not be favorable. Critics, perhaps justifiably, charged that 
the federal government does not possess the analytical resources 
that would be required, and that such a provision would swamp any 
reform effort in an overwhelming paperwork burden. Two decades 
ago, President Carter focused the analysis effort on those rules 
generating costs of $100 million or more a year and President 
Reagan maintained that size cutoff. 
Several important reforms have been legislated in recent 
years, nonetheless. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
requires federal agencies to prepare written assessments of the 
costs and benefits of significant regulatory actions that may result 
in the expenditure by state and local governments or the private 
sector of at least $100 million annually. Independent regulatory 
agencies were exempted, as were a few politically sensitive pro-
grams such as civil rights. The new law requires that an agency 
consider a "reasonable" number of regulatory alternatives and se-
lect the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alter-
native that achieves the proposed rule's objectives. The law also 
requires that Congress have a CBO cost estimate before taking 
action on such legislation. 
Pursuant to the Regulatory Accounting Act of 1996, OMB is-
sued in September 1997 a report on the costs and benefits of fed-
eral regulations. The report, prepared by OIRA, estimates the total 
benefits and costs of federal regulation but provides no supporting 
detail by agency or program. Congress has now required OMB to 
issue another such report by September 30, 1998. This report, if 
extended to include the necessary detail, could become the gen-
esis of a regulatory budget (a mechanism to control the total regu-
latory costs that federal agencies impose, akin to the limits on 
direct agency spending set by the fiscal budget). A major stumbling 
block to a regulatory budget to date has been the absence of an 
adequate database. 
A promising generic reform statute, the Small Business Regu-
latory Enforcement and Fairness Act (SBREFA), was passed in 
late 1996. Among its numerous provisions is one establishing 
a procedure for congressional review of major rules (those in-
volving annual costs of $100 million or more) before they be-
18 
... 
I 
come effective. Congress is given 60 days from the publication 
of the final rule in the Federal Register to review and reject it, 
subject to presidential veto. SBREFA also requires each regula-
tory agency to submit to Congress and the General Accounting 
Office, before the rule takes effect, a complete copy of any ben-
efit-cost analysis. 
Congress, however, has not yet used the provisions of SBREFA 
to challenge any major regulatory proposal. Among the notable lost 
opportunities was the highly debated new standards for ozone, which 
will produce comparatively small benefits at very high cost. 
While potentially very useful, the new laws, like the presiden-
tial executive orders, focus on the middle stage of the regulatory 
process, when the agencies issue rules, rather than the birth stage, 
when Congress passes the basic regulatory statutes. In any event, 
it will take a strong follow-up effort by congressional leaders to en-
sure that government agencies take these tough new provisions 
seriously. To achieve the benefits envisioned by the framers of 
this legislation, hearings should be scheduled on every major regu-
latory proposal that a regulatory agency sends to Congress, and the 
agencies' justifications for new regulations should be subjected to 
rigorous congressional examination. This would require increased 
analytical capacity for Congress. 
Proposals for Reforming Regulation 
Specific proposals for reforming regulation need to be devel-
oped within a broader framework. The following four basic stan-
dards for justifying and evaluating regulation are an attempt to 
provide such a useful framework: 
1. Regulation is warranted only when private markets do not work 
as well as regulation to protect citizens and consumers. 
A worthy objective does not necessarily create a need for regu-
lation. Government regulation is already a very large presence in 
the American economy, and clearly the American people believe 
that it is needed to achieve many important economic and social 
goals. But the ability of competitive markets to protect the public 
is very powerful. Therefore, the burden should be on those who 
would replace the market with additional regulation to demon-
strate with solid information and careful analysis that the pub-
lic would benefit from a further extension of government into 
the private sector. 
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2. Regulatory authority should not be exercised capriciously, and 
the delegation of such authority by Congress to regulatory bodies should 
be limited to ensure this. 
Small businesses are especially vulnerable to arbitrary ac-
tions by regulators. The Wisconsin toy producer who went out of 
business following an erroneous report by the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission is a classic example of a little firm unable to 
cope with large bureaucracy. The agency had refused to correct its 
error in a timely fashion even after acknowledging the mistake -
and the company lost key sales as a result. 
Often, officials lack the authority to correct an error quickly, 
even when they would like to do so. For example, the EPA admitted 
it erred in listing the household antibiotic Bacitracin as an "ex-
tremely hazardous" substance. However, the agency was precluded 
from deleting that erroneous listing without going through the same 
burdensome process that it does in listing a very hazardous product. 
3. Congress and the regulatory agencies should publicly and 
objectively evaluate the expected benefits and costs of proposed major 
regulatory efforts, using unbiased, professional, scientific advice. 
Such an evaluation also should be applied periodically to major ex-
isting regulations. 
Government decision makers involved in the regulatory pro-
cess necessarily perform a rudimentary form of cost-benefit analy-
sis when they make judgments about programs, whether they know 
it or not. It is vital that they think hard and analytically about 
these important decisions, using the best available information. 
The regulatory process would be improved if decision makers re-
lied more heavily on sound science, including peer review of the 
technical basis for new regulations. Too often, regulators are in-
fluenced more by emotional and widely publicized fears and claims 
of interest groups than by professional analysis. As a result, priori-
ties of federal agencies frequently do not reflect the relative seri-
ousness of the numerous hazards and risks to which the public is 
subjected. 
4. Where feasible and effective, regulations should be applied 
with a ''soft touch" that allows flexibility of response, including the use 
of market incentives instead of command-and-control directives. 
A regulatory system based on incentives to "do the right thing" 
can be both more effective and less costly. In pollution control, this 
means changing people's incentives so that not polluting becomes 
cheaper and easier than polluting. This approach also is far less 
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onerous when government is dealing with the average citizen than 
the more traditional approach, which imposes highly specific and 
often extremely complex directives and then emphasizes seeking 
out wrongdoers for punishment. On occasion, simply setting per-
formance standards may suffice, with the private sector having 
the flexibility to use the most cost-effective approach in achieving 
those standards. 
The Task of Congress 
The basic thrust of regulatory reform should be shifted. Virtu-
ally all reforms to date have focused on improving the way in which 
government agencies write regulations to carry out laws already en-
acted. Although this activity is useful, it ignores the compelling fact 
that the key decisions occur earlier in the process - when Congress 
writes an Occupational Safety and Health Act or an amendment to 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act or any other important regulatory 
law, usually with hundreds of pages of detailed specifications. 
Each congressional committee should be required, 
when drafting a regulatory statute, to present estimates 
of the expected benefits and costs of the regulatory 
program in the report accompanying the legislation. 
Each congressional committee should be required, when draft-
ing a regulatory statute, to present estimates of the expected ben-
efits and costs of the regulatory program in the report accompanying 
the legislation. The committee should affirm that these benefits 
justify the program in light of its estimated costs. Such a state-
ment, and the benefit-cost analysis supporting it, should be required 
before a legislative proposal can be reported to the full House or 
Senate. To the extent feasible, this report should include a mon-
etary evaluation of costs and benefits as well as a description of 
other advantages and disadvantages of the regulatory proposal. 
The way regulatory statutes are now written frequently precludes 
the agencies from even considering the most cost-effective ap-
proaches. Key provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the Clean Air Act, the 
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Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Superfund Act implicitly, or explic-
itly, prohibit the regulators from taking account of economic impacts 
when setting standards. Despite well-intended presidential direc-
tives, it is impossible for regulators to strike any sensible balance 
between the costs they impose and the benefits they generate when 
the basic regulatory laws prohibit costs from being considered at all. 
Congress should eliminate provisions in existing regulatory 
statutes that prevent or limit regulatory agencies from consider-
ing costs or comparing expected benefits with costs when design-
ing and promulgating regulations. Regulations that seek to reduce 
health or safety risks should be based on scientific risk-assess-
ment and should address risks that are real and significant rather 
than hypothetical or remote. 
Congress should establish its own professional, non-
partisan regulatory analysis organization to provide it 
with reliable data, including the required estimates of 
benefits and costs. 
From time to time, Congress should enact statutes making tech-
nical corrections of provisions of regulatory legislation that are widely 
recognized as inappropriate or generating unintended negative con-
sequences. The successful experience with the technical correc-
tion of tax laws provides a good model for such a process. (Of course, 
these problems could be minimized in the first instance if regulatory 
laws were written in clear and simple English.) 
To help it carry out the expanded reviews of regulatory laws and 
rules proposed here, Congress should establish its own professional, 
nonpartisan regulatory analysis organization to provide it with reli-
able data, including the required estimates of benefits and costs. This 
organization could be a part of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 
This new organization also should evaluate the costs and effective-
ness of existing regulatory programs. Each year it should analyze a 
limited number of current major regulatory programs. 
The CBO itself provides a good precedent for such an organiza-
tion. In carrying out their respective functions, it would be helpful 
if OIRA (the regulatory office of OMB) and its new congressional 
counterpart developed a cooperative attitude on exchanging statis-
tical and technical information, consistent with the separation of 
22 
powers between legislative and executive branches. Such an ef-
fort would be similar to existing cooperation between CBO and OMB 
on budget matters. 
Congress should also require OMB to continue on an annual 
basis its report on the costs and benefits of federal regulations, with 
supporting detail by agency and program. When regulatory cost data 
become more fully developed, Congress should establish on an ex-
perimental basis a regulatory budget for the federal government. 
The Task of Regulatory Agencies 
The current efforts of government agencies to examine the im-
pact of proposed regulations before issuing them need to be strength-
ened. By statute, these requirements should be extended to the 
so-called independent commissions, such as the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the International 
Trade Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Congress should legislate provisions for regulatory review by 
OIRA similar to those contained in the executive orders promul-
gated by Presidents Reagan and Clinton. A firm statutory basis 
would help to provide continuity in this important activity. In addi-
tion, Congress should codify in a single statute a requirement that 
regulatory agencies analyze the impact of significant regulatory 
initiatives before they are undertaken. Such an analysis of ex-
pected benefits and costs should be made a routine part of the draft-
ing of new regulations by the various federal agencies. 
Difficulties in estimating costs and benefits should not deter 
efforts to analyze the impact of regulations before they are issued. 
For example, uncertainty about the dollar benefits of air pollution 
control is not primarily a problem of statistical measurement. 
Rather, it may mainly reflect the unpleasant fact that we are un-
sure how many asthma attacks will be prevented or how much 
agricultural crop damage will be avoided by a specific emissions 
reduction. Such uncertainty should be recognized in the analysis, 
but should not be used as an excuse to proceed without analysis. 
Furthermore, in making decisions and setting priorities based 
on risk, agencies should use best estimates rather than worst-
case projections of risk. OSHA has based occupational cancer risks 
on the unrealistic assumption that a hypothetical worker is ex-
posed to the risk eight hours every day, five days a week, for 50 
weeks a year for 45 years. Similarly, the EPA sometimes assumes 
that an individual is exposed to emissions at a distance of 200 
meters from the factory, 24 hours a day, every day for 70 years. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
None of the procedural changes proposed here will succeed in 
truly improving the regulatory process unless they have the sup-
port of the public. It is the public that receives the benefits and 
pays the costs generated by the very substantial involvement of 
government in business decision making. Thus, the emphasis in 
considering these proposals should not be on the effects on either 
business or government-but on the American people. 
Nevertheless, despite the most careful preparation, reform-
ers must be ready for vehement criticism from defenders of the 
status quo. Ironically, when benefit-cost analysis is used to justify 
large government water projects, local beneficiaries rarely chal-
lenge the calculations. But when the analysis contradicts the po-
sition of active interest groups, the analysis quickly comes under 
attack. 
A final barrier to careful analysis is the common and errone-
ous perception that the costs of government regulation are of little 
concern to citizens because they are simply "paid by business." 
That is not so. By and large, those costs are ultimately borne by 
the individual workers and consumers who make and purchase 
the products and services produced under regulation. Moreover, 
much of the rule making extends to all employers, be they profit or 
nonpr~fit, in the public sector or in the private sector. Many regu-
lations disproportionately affect smaller enterprises and organiza-
tions. In the case of paperwork, for example, each firm, regardless 
of size, may have to fill out the same burdensome form. 
The criticism in this report of the government's response to 
public concems about worker safety, the environment, and similar 
issues does not imply that those public concerns are not legitimate 
or should be ignored. The analysis here, rather, leads to the com-
pelling conclusion that the American people deserve better results 
from the very substantial amounts of resources, time, and effort 
devoted to government regulation than is now the case. Air ought 
to be cleaner, water purer and workplaces safer, at the same time 
that consumer living standards are higher. The motivating force 
for the reforms proposed here is to improve the lives of our citizens. 
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